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ATTORNEYS BEWARE: INCREASED LIABILITY FOR
PROVIDING ADVICE TO CORPORATE CLIENTS ISSUING
SECURITIES
INTRODUCTION
At a time in the not too distant past, attorneys could reasonably expect to
remain on the sidelines of any litigation arising from their participation in the
issuance of securities. Although banks,' accountants,2 investment bankers,3
employees of corporations issuing securities," stock brokers,5 and even stock ex-
changes 6 have been held liable for securities law violations as a result of their
participation in or connection with a defendant who has violated a securities
law, attorneys were previously insulated from such litigation. However, this
was apparently forgotten in 1968 when the Southern District of New York
held that two attorneys who had participated in the preparation of a prospec-
tus used by a corporate issuer of securities were among a group of defendants
liable to purchasers of the securities for the losses due to a decline in the value
of the stock that they had purchased.7 Although this holding did not open the
floodgates of litigation involving attorneys as defendants for securities laws
violations, it may have been indicative of things to come.
Recent headlines have informed us that attorneys can and will be held
liable for securities law violations. It is important to remember that the threat
of litigation can be just as costly as an actual negative verdict in a trial. This
potential liability for attorneys can be clearly seen in the recent cash settlement
of $40 million entered into by the New York law firm of Rogers & Wells
because of their representation of a California investment firm.' Another ex-
ample is the recent suit brought by First Bank Minneapolis against their own
'See, e.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 930
(1978); Rosen v. Dick, 11974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,786 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
1974).
'See, e.g., Kestenbaum v. Emerson, 11979-1980 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,330
(S.D.N.Y. March 19,1980); H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F.Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
'See, e.g., lIT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
'See, e.g., Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011
(1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976).
'See, e.g. Schillner v. H. Vaughn Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943); Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988
(1st Cit. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
'See, e.g., Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F.Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
'Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F.Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
'The National Law Journal, April 14, 1986, at 1, col. 1. Rogers & Wells were named as defendants due to
their representation of a California investment firm known as J. David & Co. The principal thrust behind
plaintiff's claim is that Rogers & Wells became aware or should have known of the fraud being perpetrated
by J. David Co. Although Rogers & Wells apparently avoided litigation, they were subsequently named as a
defendant in another suit. At the present time, there has not been a settlement or trial on the merits so the
issue of Rogers & Wells ultimate liability is still unclear. For further discussion see The National Law Jour-
nal, May 5, 1986, at 3, col. I.
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outside counsel, Dorsey & Whitney.' Although the case was settled on the eve
of the trial, it provides an indication that attorneys are no longer insulated
from the threat of litigation for alleged securities law violations.
Although the law in this area is rapidly evolving, a general overview of re-
cent case law seems to indicate that attorneys may be liable even though their
participation in the issuance of securities only involved rendering routine ser-
vices to a corporate client. If an attorney were to have an active part in ac-
tivities such as business planning or the promotion of securities, their exposure
to potential liability would increase dramatically. As a result of this rapid
change in the law, there is a degree of uncertainty concerning the potential
liabilities attorneys may face when assisting their corporate clients in issuing
securities. In an attempt to address some of this uncertainty, this article will
analyze the potential liability for attorneys under three provisions of the
federal securities laws. Although there are other sections of the 1933 and 1934
Acts under which an attorney may be subjected to liability, because the bulk of
the litigation involving the issuance of securities has been brought primarily
under three sections, those sections will be the primary focus of this article.
These provisions are Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, and Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
POTENTIAL CLAIMS UNDER THE SECURITIES AcT OF 1933
Section 11 Claims
This Section of the 1933 Act imposes civil liability on five types of in-
dividuals for misrepresentations or omissions in registration statements that
must be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to sell
securities. Although Section I I provisions for liability are extensive, the
statute explicitly delineates the types of individuals upon whom liability may
be imposed. Individuals subject to liability under Section I I include: everyone
who signs a registration statement; all directors or partners of the issuing com-
pany; all persons, who consent, who are about to become a director or partner;
any expert who assists in the preparation or certification of the registration
statement; and, the underwriters of any security. 0
Although the individuals potentially liable under Section 11 are
numerous, all those potentially liable, with the exception of the issuer, are af-
forded the opportunity of asserting a defense of due care. The extent of liability
and the type of due care defense available to defendants under Section 11 will
'The National Law Journal, August 11, 1986, at 3, col. I. First Bank brought a suit against Dorsey &
Whitney for the firms involvement of the public offering of securities giving an interest in the monorail at
the Minnesota Zoological Gardens. First Bank claimed that Dorsey & Whitney represented all parties in-
volved in the offering and that they also were aware of the misrepresentations made by the investment bank-
ing firm of Smith Barney. Although Dorsey & Whitney ultimately settled on the eve of trial, the suit exhibits
the expanding potential for the threat of liability to be used as a tool by plaintiffs against defendant-
attorneys in securities litigation.
"15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(a)(i)-(5) (1975).
[Vol. 20:3
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vary depending on whether or not a defendant is an expert, or if the false state-
ment was made under the authority of an expert who gave their consent to be
named as an expert in a registration statement.
In the case of an expert, the expert can only be held liable for statements
which he rendered as a professional opinion." However, this is not absolute
liability and in the event that an expert's statements are proven inaccurate, the
expert may assert that he had conducted an investigation and reasonably
believed the statements he made were correct. 2 On the other hand, there is the
liability faced by a lay defendant. Excluding that portion of the registration
statement prepared by experts, other potential defendants are liable for the
truth and completeness of the entire registration statement. However, these
potential defendants are also given the opportunity to assert an affirmative
defense of reasonable investigation and a belief in the accuracy of the data con-
tained in the registration statement. 3 The statute goes further to inform us
that the standard of reasonableness required to assert such a defense is that
reasonableness which would be "required of a prudent man in the manage-
ment of his own property."' 4 However, any portion of the registration state-
ment prepared by experts permits the lay defendant's duty of care to be much
lower. The portion of the registration statement prepared by experts requires
no investigation by the nonexpert defendants and the nonexpert defendants
only need to show that there was no reasonable grounds available to indicate
that the expert's statements were false or misleading."
If an individual defendant is unlucky enough to be classified as an appro-
priate defendant as delineated in Section 1 I(a)(1)-(5), and they cannot effective-
ly assert a defense of due care, the probability of avoiding liability becomes
"15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(a)(4) (1975).
"Id. at § 77(k)(b)(3)(B)(i) (1975). A review of the exact statutory language may be helpful. The statute states
that an expert may assert a due diligence defense after "he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that
the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading..."
"Id. at § 77(k)(b)(3)(A) (1975). The exact language in the statute which allows this defense is "as regards any
part of the registration statement not purporting to be made on the authority of an expert, and not purport-
ing to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of an expert, and not purporting to be made on the
authority of a public official document or statement, he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that
the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading..
'Id. at § 77(k)(c) (1975).
"Id. at § 77(k)(b)(3)(c) (1975). The language excusing a defendant from reviewing an experts portion of the
registration statements states that "as regards any part of the registration statement purporting to be made
on the authority of an expert (other than himself) or purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report or
valuation of an expert) other than himself), he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe, at
the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein were untrue or
that there was an omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading, or that such part of the registration statement did not fairly represent the
statement of the expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from the report or valuation of the expert ..."
COMMENTSWinter, 19871
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very slim. Due to the express liability provisions which are subject to certain
enumerated defenses, plaintiffs are not required to show reliance on the false
or misleading statements, or causation of damages to establish a cause of ac-
tion under Section 11.16 The only hope a defendant has of escaping liability is if
he can support the highly unlikely contention that the decline in the value of
plaintiffs holdings was unrelated to the material misrepresentations or omis-
sions. 7
For liability to be imposed upon an attorney, he must fall into one of the
five previously noted categories. If an attorney were a member of an issuing
corporations board, it is quite obvious that he could be subjected to liability.
However, if an attorney does not fall into one of the five classes, he probably
will not be subject to liability under Section 11. Nevertheless, it has frequently
been asserted that an attorney who prepares a registration statement should be
found to be an "expert" under Section 11, and therefore be subjected to liabili-
ty. 18
The first case to squarely address the issue of an attorney as an expert and
the subsequent liability under Section 11 was Escott v. Barchris Construction
Corporation. The claim plaintiffs asserted in Barchris was brought under Sec-
tion 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.20 The instrument alleged to have con-
tained false information and material omissions was the registration statement
for 5.5 per cent convertible subordinated fifteen year debentures that were
issued by Barchris Construction Corp."
Although two of the attorneys involved in Barchris were ultimately found
liable for violations of Section 11, several interesting facts should be
highlighted before jumping to any conclusions about the liability of attorneys
under Section 11. First, it should be recognized that both of the attorneys who
were defendants in Barchris were on the board of directors of Barchris Con-
struction Corp.22 It seems apparent that the defendants in this instance were
corporate directors first and attorneys second. However, several of the at-
torneys' co-defendants in Barchris attempted to assert that because the
registration statement was prepared by one of the corporate director's
(defendant-attorneys) law firms, that the entire statement was prepared by an
expert and therefore the nonexpert defendants should be excused from liabili-
"Emmi v. First Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 336 F.Supp. 629 (D.C. Me. 1971).
'
1Greenapple v. Detroit Edison Co., 618 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1980).
"See Escot, 283 F. Supp. 643; In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 593 F. Supp. 612 (D. Minn. 1984).
11283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2015 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1975). Plaintiffs challenged the accuracy of several figures that were contained in the
prospectus and the registration statement. Plaintiffs also alleged that the text of the prospectus lacked
material information and contained false information in numerous instances. Escort, 283 F. Supp. at 655.
2
'Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 652.
"Id. at 686-89. Even assuming that defendant-attorneys were not experts, they still would have faced liabili-
ty as a corporate director under § 77(k)(a)(2).
[Vol. 20:3
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ty." In rejecting this assertion the court stated that to say that the entire
registration statement was prepared by an expert simply because it was
prepared by a lawyer would be an unreasonable construction of the statute. 4
Therefore, it appears as if the only area where an attorney should be subjected
to expert status is where an attorney would render opinions on such matters
such as the status of pending litigation or the worthiness of title to real proper-
ty. To find that an attorney, acting as a mere scrivenor, should be subjected to
liability for the entire registration document, does not meet the requirements
of an expert under Section 1 1.15 Additionally, by a simple preparation of a
registration statement, one could argue that an attorney does not consent to
the use of his name as an expert as to every statement made in the registration
statement. Therefore, an attorney acting as a draftsman for a registration
statement falls comfortably short of being lofted to the unenviable status and
liabilities of an expert. To assume otherwise would mean that all non-attorney,
non-expert defendants under Section 11 claims could escape liability simply by
claiming a Section I1 (b)(3)(c) defense."6 This would hardly seem to be in focus
with the remedial nature of the statute.
In a recent case, a plaintiff attempted to rely on Barchris and impose
liability on attorneys who had drafted the registration statements for a cor-
poration issuing 30 day variable rate demand notes, and who indicated that
they had "passed upon all legal matters" in connection with the registration
statement. 7 In Ahern v. Gaussoin, the plaintiffs asserted that because defen-
dant attorneys had extensive knowledge of issuer's business affairs and were
involved a great deal in the offering of the notes, that the attorneys should be
liable as experts under Section 11 (a)(4) of the 1933 Act.28 Defendant-attorneys
argued that for an attorney to be liable under Section 11, such liability would
only arise if they render their opinion as an expert on a particular matter.2 9
In rejecting plaintiffs claims attempting to hold attorney-drafters liable
under Section 11, the court stated that there are certain individuals who should
not be subjected to liability because they participated in the preparation of a
registration statement. 30 These excluded individuals should include attorneys
3Id. at 683.
1 Id. at 683. The court explicitly rejected this assertion and stated: "Neither the lawyer for the company nor
the lawyer for the underwriters is an expert within the meaning of Section 11. The only expert, in the statu-
tory sense," were the auditors, "and the only parts of the registration statement which purported to be made
upon the authority of an expert were the portions which purported to be made on" the auditor's authority.
2Id.
2115 U.S.C. § 77(k)(b)(3) (1975). This defense allows non-expert defendants to avoid liability if a portion of
the statement was prepared by an expert. However, liability may only be avoided for the portion of the
registration that has been prepared by an expert.
"Ahern v. Gaussoin, 611 F.Supp. 1465 (D.C. Or. 1985).
"id at 1482.
29 d.
0Id.
COMMENTSWinter, 19871
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not acting as experts.3 1
The argument that attorneys who prepare registration statements are not
experts under Section 11 (4) can be strengthened by reliance on another recent
United States District Court decision. 2 In In Re Flight Transportation Cor-
poration Securities Litigation, plaintiffs attempted to assert that defendant-
attorneys33 were experts because they were named in the prospectus as having
drafted the instrument. 4 In rejecting this argument, the court relied on Bar-
chris and reiterated the holding that:
to state that the entire registration statement is expertised because some
lawyer prepared it would be an unreasonable construction of the statute.3 5
However, while it appears Barchris is granting attorney-directors the lux-
ury of a defense with a standard similar to that of a lay director, the court in
another portion of its discussion gave an indication that attorney-directors
such as those in Barchris may be held to a higher standard by stating:
as the director most directly concerned with writing the registration state-
ment and assuring its accuracy, more was required of him in the way of
reasonable investigation than could fairly be expected of a director who
had no connection with this work."
Although this language appears to create a higher standard of care for attor-
ney-directors, it is apparent from a review of other case law that attorneys who
are not directors and act only as scrivenors may not be held liable as experts
under Section 11 of the 1933 Act. It would appear that if an attorney were to
fall into one of the other categories of individuals liable under Section 11, they
would be held to a higher standard of liability in reviewing the registration
statement. The reason for this higher standard of accountability is the pre-
sumption that attorneys are more familiar with the securities laws and because
they actually were involved with the preparation of the registration state-
ments. 7
111d. The court relied upon the United States Supreme Court case of Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 386 (1983). In rejecting plaintiffs argument based on the Barchris decision, the Ahern court
stated that Barchris was clearly distinguishable because the attorney-defendants in that case were also direc-
tors and were therefore subject to liability under § I I(a)(2) because of their capacity as a director.
"In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 593 F. Supp. 612 (D. Minn. 1984).
"Id. at 616. Defendants served as counsel to the underwriting firm who originally sold securities and assisted
Flight Transportation Corporation in the preparation of required registration statements.
3'Id.
"Id. at 616 citing Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 683.
'3Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 690. As a defense the attorney-director asserted that for such a standard to be ap-
plied to him, this would be analogous to requiring an issuing company's attorney make an independent audit
of the figures supplied to him by the issuing company. In rejecting this argument the court indicated that the
question was did the attorney-director make a reasonable effort to detect errors and omissions which could
have been discovered without an audit.
371d.
[Vol. 20:3
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Winter, 19871
Another potential area of liability for attorneys under Section 11 of the
1933 Act, may be a claim that an attorney aided and abetted an individual who
violated federal securities laws. However, as the Flight Transportation court
pointed out, because the statute specifically delineates who may be held liable
for violations of Section 11, the courts should not extend liability through a
theory of aiding and abetting to other persons who are not included in the
categories of potential defendants."
Section 12 Claims
Another area of potential liability for attorneys assisting in the issuance of
securities is Section 12 of the 1933 Act. This Section provides for civil liabilities
and a remedy for purchasers of securities when the offer or sale was made with
false or misleading statements or material omissions in an oral statement or
prospectus.39 The major difference between Sections 1 1 and 12 is that Section
12 does not specifically delineate appropriate categories of defendants. Instead,
Section 12 provides for the imposition of liability upon any "seller" of a securi-
ty.40 Like Section 11, under Section 12 it is possible to impose liability for mere
negligence. Additionally, although the plaintiff must prove that he had no
knowledge of the untruth or omission, if a defendant attempts to rely on an af-
firmative defense of due care or due diligence, the burden of proof is then on
the defendant. 41
Although there are other federal securities law provisions that expressly
3 Flight Transportation, 593 F. Supp. at 616, citing In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Sec. Litig., 416
F. Supp. 161, 181 (C.D. Col. 1976). Other cases holding that an attorney cannot be found liable under § II
of the 1933 Act through a theory of aiding and abetting include Ahern, 611 F. Supp. at 1465; Hagert v.
Glickkman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (D. Minn. 1981); McFarland v. Memorex Corp.,
493 F. Supp. 631, 642 (N.D. Cal. 1980). The most notable exception to this proposition is In re Caesar's
Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 378-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). However the Flight Transportation court
specifically rejected the Ceaser's Palace decision and relied upon the Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston
decision rendered by the Supreme Court.
"15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1975). This section provides for civil liabilities for: "[Alny person who -
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77(e) of this title, or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 77(c) of this title,
other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said section), by the use of any means or instruments
of transportation or communication in interstate comerce or of the mails, by means of a prospec-
tus oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and
who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing
such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of
any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer
owns the security."
"15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(3) (1975) defines the terms "sell" and "offer to sell." Additional help in defining these
terms can be found in Rules 138 and 139 that accompany the Securities Act of 1933, see 17 C.F.R. §§
230.138 and 230.139 (1986).
"For a better discussion of the elements of and who has the burden of proof in a § 12 claim, see The John
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 11968 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,268 (D. Md. 1968).
COM MENTS
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make securities fraud illegal, 2 Section 12(2) explicitly permits a plaintiff to bring
a civil action against a seller, 3 and seek to recover damages or a recission of the
purchase." However, a potential obstacle for individuals attempting to assert a
Section 12 claim is that the buyer's remedy is limited to the immediate seller. 5
This requirement of privity would seemingly insulate a remote seller or his
associate from liability for fraud. ' However, courts have had little difficulty in
placing liability upon agents or brokers who represent the seller. 7 In fact, there
have been occasions where a court has completely relaxed the privity require-
ment and used language such as "participants in a sale" interchangeably with
the word "seller."48 Fortunately for attorneys, persons held liable as par-
ticipants have generally been individuals who had active roles in the solicita-
tion of purchasers or consummation of the transaction, and who were aware of
the fraud that was being perpetrated.49
Therefore, it appears that an attorney who has done nothing more than
provide routine service and advice to a client without having direct investor
contact would be fairly insulated from Section 12 liability. One noted authority
has even gone so far as to assert that absent knowing participation in the pro-
pagation of the misleading material, liability should not be extended to an at-
torney unless the attorney was aware of the possibility of fraud. 0 This conclu-
sion that Section 12 liability only extends to "sellers" of a security places great
12§ 17(a) of the 1933 Act and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contain anti-fraud provisions
that make it unlawful to use any manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the sale of a security.
15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1975) and 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1983).
41See Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1979). This court held that § 12(2) allowed the
purchaser to bring a claim against the immediate seller.
4"For a good discussion of the remedies generally available under § 12(2) see Peterson, Recent Developments
in Civil Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 5 Hous. L. REV. 274 (1967). Although
this article is 20 years old, it provides an excellent overview of remedies available to buyers and defenses
available to sellers.
"The relevant part of the statute that indicates this requirement of privity is as follows: "Any person who of-
fers or sells a security . .. shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him..." 15 U.S.C. §
77(1)(2) (1975). For the full text of this statute, see note 39 supra.
"A good example of such a situation would be where the person or entity passing title to the security is not
responsible for the omission or misrepresentation, rather his agent is the true violator of § 12. For example, a
stockbroker who fraudulently arranged a sale, may avoid liability because the immediate seller is the client.
See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES & MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1194 (5th ed. 1980).
"See Schillner v. H. Vaughn Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943); Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988 (1st
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
41See, e.g., Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964). In Lennerth, an agent for the defen-
dant corporation made the initial contact with the plaintiffs, explained all the details concerning the pro-
posed venture and at that point stepped aside, theoretically excusing himself from the consummation of the
sale and therefore avoiding § 12 liability. However, the court noted that the agent did everything but draw
up and sign the contract, and since the plaintiffs injury was a direct and proximate result of the agents ac-
tions, the agent was found to be a seller under § 12.
41See Lennerth, 234 F. Supp, at 59; Filmways, Inc. v. Artistic Liquidating Corp., [1969 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); MacClain v. Bules, 275 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1960).
"See L. Loss, SECURrTES REGULATION 1716 (1967), "plaintiff obviously would have the burden of proving...
other persons had participated in an unlawful sale, a burden which would almost inevitably involve proof by
the plaintiff of some sort of scienter on their part." Id.
[Vol. 20:3
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emphasis on the importance of the interpretation of the term "seller."
Although a complete discussion of judicial interpretation of the definition of
"seller" could conceivably constitute an entire treatise, this article will attempt
to provide a basic framework for an understanding of who is a "seller" for pur-
poses of Section 12 liability.
As noted, a key to determining potential liability for attorneys serving as
counsel to issuers is in the interpretation of the term "seller." Although there
are still courts that cling to the notion that absolute privity is required between
a buyer and a seller," the trend is toward more flexibility in determining who is
a "seller. 5 2
In refusing to accept a more relaxed view as to who is a "seller" for pur-
poses of Section 12 liability, the Third Circuit adopted the requirement of privi-
ty in Collins v. Signetics Corp.53 In Collins, plaintiffs were purchasers of public-
ly offered stock who claimed that defendant corporation violated the
disclosure provisions of Section 12. Plaintiffs did not purchase stock from
defendant corporation, but from two individuals who were members of the
underwriting syndicate.5 The court dismissed plaintiffs' claim and held that
unless there was evidence that the issuer controlled56 the seller-underwriters,
the issuer lacked the requisite privity with the purchaser and therefore the
plaintiffs' claim was dismissed.57
"
1See Turner v. First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899, 912 (D. Wis. 1978). This court held that
§ 12(2) only created a cause of action against an immediate seller.
"
2See Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and How it Compares with Rule
lOb-5, 13 Hous. L. REV. 231, 247-248 (1976). The author states that: "A clear trend in favor of extending the
scope of the statute appears to be emerging. Originally, § 12(2) was given restrictive application, limited to
the immediate seller or those in a "controlling person" relationship, pursuant to § 15 of the Securities Act of
19[313 with the seller. Those alleged merely to have "aided and abetted" in the wrong, but not in privity with
the seller, purchaser, or both, were held excluded from the coverage of § 12(2). However, there were some
cases, even then, which recognized the possibility of § 12(2) being applied to persons directly involved with
the seller in the commission of the wrongs alleged to give rise to liability, as well as brokers acting for the
seller.
The main stumbling block appears to be that the only remedy available under § 12(2) is recission, the
theory being that it is only proper to provide such relief as against the one who received the consideration in
the sale. On the other hand, in view of the liberal spirit intended for the statute, and as other decisions have
expressly held that recission is a proper remedy even under rule l Ob-5 to apply against non-sellers, the scope
of § 12(2) has been significantly expanded. Thus, recent cases have upheld rights of action under § 12(2)
against lawyers, underwriters, accountants, and banks when they were shown to directly aided and abetted
the wrong. (footnotes omitted).
53605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1979).
'Plaintiffs purchased the stock for $17 a share. Plaintiffs alleged that the parent company, Corning, failed to
disclose the fact of its intention to entirely divest itself of its interest in Signetics. Plaintiffs further alleged
that Signetics was aware of Corning's intentions and actively participated in the search for a buyer. Eighteen
months after plaintiffs purchased the stock, Coming liquidated its interest in Signetics when Signetics merged
into another corporation. As a result of the merger, Signetics shareholders were forced to surrender their
stock for $8 per share. Id. at 112-113.
"Neither of the individuals from whom plaintiffs purchased the stock were named as defendants in the suit.
"In discussing issuers control, the court was referring to § 15 of the 1933 Act which extends liability under
§§ I I and 12 beyond the immediate seller to a "controlling" individual.
"Collins, 605 F.2d at 112-113. In justifying the decision, the court placed great emphasis on the exact
statutory language of § 12, claiming that Congress intended that the section mean exactly what it says, that
is, a purchaser may have a claim only against his immediate seller.
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Although the Third Circuit still maintains a requirement of privity for a
Section 12 claim, it is definitely in the minority.5" In this trend toward a more
expansive interpretation of a "seller," courts have generally applied four legal
theories to justify the imposition of liability upon individuals other than the
immediate seller of a security. First, the courts have attempted to measure the
degree of participation of the seller's agent to determine if the agent's actions
were a substantial part or proximate cause of the fraudulent sale. 9 Second,
there is an imprecise test put forth by the Eighth Circuit which focuses upon
the question of "whether the defendant was uniquely positioned to ask rele-
vant questions, acquire material information, or disclose his findings." Third,
liability is imposed if a defendant aided and abetted or conspired with the im-
mediate seller to effectuate the fraudulent transaction. 61 Finally, if an in-
dividual is a "controlling person" under Section 15 of the 1933 Act, that in-
dividual may also be held liable under Section 12 if they are involved in a
fraudulent transaction.62 Although all four theories of liability are of great im-
portance to attorneys, because the fourth test, the controlling person test,
essentially has its basis in Section 15 of the 1933 Act, this article will. only
focus on the first three tests.
Degree of Participation
Although this appears to be a very nebulous concept, there are two stan-
dards that are generally applied in order to impose liability upon a defendant
"See note 52 supra.
"There are two approaches to finding liability under this theory. One, espoused by the 2nd Circuit requires
that defendant actually participated in the transaction, and the other utilized by the 5th Circuit requires that
a defendant's participation be a substantial factor in, or the proximate cause of the fraudulent transaction.
Compare Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826, 830 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Ceaser's Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F.
Supp. 366, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) with Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 713-14 (5th Cir. 1980); Pharo v.
Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980).
6"This theory appears to have been borrowed from a criminal law theory. For a good discussion of how
courts extend § 12, which on its face only applies to immediate sellers, to apply to defendants who have aid-
ed and abetted an immediate sellers, to apply to defendants who have aided and abetted an immediate seller
in a fraudulent transaction, see Brick v. Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283, 306
(W.D.N.Y. 1977). In Brick, the court held that a party who was actively involved with or participated in a
fraudulent sale, may be held liable under an aider and abettor or conspirator theory under § 12(2).
"Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 886 (8th Cir. 1977). Although in a latter case, the same court applied the
"substantial factor test propounded by the Fifth Circuit, there was not a clear indication that the unique
position test was being explicitly overruled. See Stokes v. Lokken, 664 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981). In fact,
lower courts have continued to follow the test outlined by the Eighth Circuit in Wasson as controlling. See,
e.g., Lewis v. Shultz, 11985-86 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,383 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
62§ 15 of the 1933 Act extends liability under § 12 to persons who are controlling individuals. The section
reads as follows:
"Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency or otherwise, or who pursuant to or in
connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock
ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k [11] or 771 [121 of this
title, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to
any person to who such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of
or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the con-
trolled person is alleged to exist.
IS U.S.C. § 77(o) (1975). This section of the 1933 Act specifically delineates when the privity requirement
between a buyer and a seller may be statutorily circumvented.
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who is not an immediate seller. The first, that of the Second Circuit, hinges
upon whether or not the defendant actually participated in the transaction.63
The second, outlined in detail by the Fifth Circuit, requires that the
defendant's participation be a substantial factor in or the proximate cause of
the fraudulent transaction. 4 Although the Fifth Circuit's test is generally
believed to be more restrictive,65 the Second Circuit has recently required that a
defendant have active, meaningful or significant participation in the
fraudulent transaction and essentially interpret the two tests as being the
same." Therefore, this article will primarily focus upon the degree of participa-
tion test as outlined by the Fifth Circuit.
The proximate cause requirement that is demanded by the Fifth Circuit
test originated in Lennerth v. Mendenhall.67 In Lennerth, an agent for the cor-
poration issuing securities made the initial contact with the plaintiffs, and fully
explained the specific details of the proposed transactions.6 However, when
the time ultimately arrived for the consummation of the transaction, the agent
did not actually participate in the mechanics of the consummation. 69 A strict
interpretation of Section 12(2) as utilized by the Third Circuit in Collins"
would apparently excuse the defendant from liability. However, the Lennerth
Court held that plaintiffs injury was a direct and proximate result of defen-
dant agent's actions and therefore, agent could be found liable as a seller under
Section 12(2)."'
The first actual adoption of the proximate cause test in the Fifth Circuit
was in the case of Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc. 72
The defendants in this case were controlling stockholders of American Interna-
tional Franchises (American), who had solicited local investors to incorporate
state or regional franchise sales centers.73 The individuals who were solicited by
American, then sold stock to a third group of investors in the newly formed
corporation.74 The issue in the case was whether the original controlling
stockholders in American were liable to the third group of investors even
"See supra note 59.
"Id
"See, e.g., Wasson, 558 F.2d at 879.
"See Katz v. David W. Katz & Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) J 99,669
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
"7234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
"id. at 64.
"Id.
70605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1979).
"Lennerth, 234 F. Supp. at 65. The actual test for the determination of liability was phrased as follows: "But
for the presence of the defendant... in the negotiations preceding the sale, could the sale have been consum-
mated?" Id.
7448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
"Id. at 684.
7"Id
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though the original American stockholders had no contact with the third
group of investors.75 The court ultimately affirmed the trial court's decision in
favor of the plaintiffs under Sections 12(1) and 12(2).76
At first glance, it appears that the Hill York court may have taken two ap-
parently inconsistent positions concerning the issue of who could be a "seller"
under Section 12. On the one hand the court explicitly asserted that the law is
well settled that a purchaser may only recover from his immediate seller." This
position would indicate that there could only be one proper defendant and that
would be the actual person or entity who "directly" sold the security to a pur-
chaser. However, in the very next sentence of the opinion, the court stated
that it was presently unclear who could be a "seller" for purposes of the imposi-
tion of Section 12 liability.78 The court did note that it is clear that the seller is
not required to be the individual who actually passes title. 9 Although this was
an apparent contradiction in positions, the court reconciled the dilemma by
adopting the proximate cause analysis first set forth in Lennerth.0
After the Hill York decision, subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions modified
and ultimately refined the "proximate cause" test that the court used."' In fact,
the first Fifth Circuit case to address an analogous case restated the proximate
cause test and refined it to require that the defendants actions were a "substan-
tial factor" in the inducement of the fraudulent transaction." As a result of this
refinement and modification, the test presently used by the Fifth Circuit is
whether the defendant's participation is a "substantial factor" in, or the "prox-
imate cause" of, the fraudulent transaction. 3 However, even the Fifth Circuit
"Id. at 692. While previous cases may have held that this factor of no contact between the original
American stockholders and the third group of investors would render the claim meritless, the court noted
that this circuit had rejected the strict privity requirement on two prior occasions, citing Strahan v. Pedroni,
387 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1967); Lynn v. Caraway, 252 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. La. 1966), affdper curiam, 379
F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 951 (1968).
"Hill York, 448 F.2d at 685-86, 698.
"Id. at 692.
781d.
7Id.
Id at 693 citing Lennerth. The court stated that in
"[Alpplying this test to the problem at hand, it is at once apparent that the defendants fall within its
letter and spirit. The defendants were the motivating force behind this whole project. They sought out
the original incorporators of Florida Franchise and then trained them to solicit additional capital for
the corporation. They provided the sales brochures designed to secure this additional capital. They
rendered advice on every aspect of the corporate formation and subsequent development. In fact, the
defendants did everything but effectuate the actual sale. We can deduce with certainty that the plain-
tiffs would not have purchased this stock had the defendants not traveled to Florida carrying their
bag of promotional ideas. "The hunter who seduces the prey and leads it to the trap he has set is no
less guilty than the hunter whose hand springs the snare." Thus we find the defendants to be persons
who sold or offered to sell within the meaning of Section 12(1) and, therefore, hold them liable under
that section. (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted.)
"See, e.g., Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980).
"Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 622 (5th Cir. 1973).
"See Pharo, 621 F.2d at 656.
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has not been conclusively consistent in its determination of who is a "seller"
under this test.
In Croy v. Campbell, 14 the Fifth Circuit held that a tax attorney, who ad-
vised his client about the tax ramifications of purchasing a limited partnership
interest, did not provide plaintiff with sufficient grounds to establish that the
attorney was a seller under Section 12(2).5 In Croy, the defendant attorney ar-
ranged for plaintiffs to meet with the proposed real estate developer, and gave
a good recommendation of the proposed investment as a tax shelter. 6 Al-
though the defendant tax attorneys advice was an important consideration, the
trial court held that since defendant made no representations concerning the
investment other than to recommend the potential tax effects, nor did defen-
dant try to actively induce plaintiffs to invest, that defendant was not a "seller"
under Section 12(2). 7 In affirming the trial court's decision, the Fifth Circuit
held that simply providing tax advice is not a "substantial factor" in causing
the sale."8 It does appear that Croy totally disregarded the relationship between
the real estate developer and defendant attorney and the fact that the attorney
arranged the initial contact between the plaintiffs and the real estate developer.
Although it seems that Croy would exempt attorneys rendering routine advice,
the court explicitly included a warning to attorneys when it stated that its hold-
ing "should not be interpreted to mean that a lawyer who participates in the
transaction can never be the seller for purposes of section 1 2."89
Soon after the Croy decision, the Fifth Circuit apparently relaxed the
proximate cause test in Junker v. Crory.90 In Junker, a defendant attorney was
counsel to two companies involved in a merger and a controlling stockholder.9'
As a proxy for the controlling stockholder, defendant-attorney proposed the
idea of a merger, actually prepared the merger documents, made representa-
tions concerning the feasibility of liquidation, and actively persuaded share-
holders to make stock purchases.92 Additionally, it was later alleged that many
of defendant's representations were misleading and inaccurate. 9 In actuality,
1'624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980).
851d.
"Id. at 711.
"~Id. at 712, 714.
"
8id. at 714. It provides interesting grounds for speculation to venture a guess as to whether or not defen-
dants would have been liable if the court had simply applied the test first outlined in Hill York. Although
there is no correct answer, one would suspect that the test may have been a little too stringent for the Fifth
Circuit to maintain and follow.
9d.
90650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981).
9lId.
1id. at 1360. The court was very careful in distinguishing Croy. They noted that unlike the inactive part
played by lawyer in Croy, the attorney in this case was not playing the role of a passive advisor, rather he
"was an active negotiator in the transaction, acting as agent-in-fact as well as attorney-at-law, implementor
not counsellor."
"Id. at 1356. At the trial court, the judge found that Heisler, in representing both companies involved in a
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the defendant attorney was nothing more than an agent for the seller, and he
actively participated in the consummation of the transaction." In affirming the
trial court's holding, the Fifth Circuit held that defendant attorney was "an ac-
tive negotiator in the transaction" and as such, by applying the proximate
cause/substantial factor test, defendant attorney was a "seller" under Section
12.95
As previously noted, it appears as if Cory and Junker may be potentially
inconsistent. However, upon a closer comparison of the two cases, it seems as
if the Fifth Circuit is suggesting that the imposition of liability under Section
12 can rest on the extent of the slight differences in the roles played by
defendant-attorneys in the transactions. In Croy, the court apparently ignored
the proximate cause aspect of the defendant's behavior. Additionally, the court
overlooked the apparently cozy relationship defendant shared with the real
estate developer. Instead, the court focused more on the nature of defendant's
involvement rather than the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. In
distinguishing Croy, the Junker court gave substantial attention to the dif-
ferences between the passive advisor in Croy and the active negotiator in
Junker.96 However, assuming the court was correct in making such a distinc-
tion, we were given no indication of the point at which a defendant's actions
become a substantial factor in the inducement of a transaction. Nevertheless,
the Fifth Circuit's approach is much better than simply focusing on the re-
quirement that a defendant participate in a transaction. At the very least, the
Fifth Circuit has attempted to outline a framework which provides litigants an
idea of how to evaluate potential claims. Unfortunately, the application of
such a test does not preclude the imposition of liability upon an attorney who
had no direct contact with a purchaser.
In Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan,9 defendant-attorney made oral
misrepresentations to a purchaser of interests in oil and gas leases regarding
the encumbrances on said leases. 98 Plaintiff brought suit against defendant-
attorney claiming that they suffered damages as a direct result of defendant-
merger, was familiar with the financial conditions of both companies. Additionally, this court held that
Heisler was intentional or reckless in failing to disclose the true value of the merging companies property.
I'd at 1360.
"Id. It appears as if the court used a two-step process in determining defendant-attorneys liability. First, the
court looked to defendant-attorneys amount of involvement in the transaction. After it was determined that
defendant-attorney was indeed a seller for purposes of § 12(2), the court then reviewed defendant-attorneys
statements that were made concerning the proposed transaction. It would be interesting to speculate on
whether defendant attorney would have faced liability for his statements had he not been found to be a seller
under § 12(2). Although it is quite possible plaintiffs could have been liable under another section of the
1933 Act, it is also possible that defendant-attorney may have been able to avoid the liability if the court had
held his actions were not sufficient to implicate him as a "seller."
111d. For a better discussion of this point, review the comments and text accompanying supra note 92.
9'616 F.Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
"Id. at 459-461.
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attorneys alleged misrepresentations in connection with the sale of securities."
In defense of plaintiffs claim, defendant asserted that his preparation of title
reports was merely participation in the events leading up to the transaction,
and therefore, his participation would not provide a sufficient basis to impose
seller liability under Section 12."0 In rejecting defendant's contention, the
court held that defendant's representations were certainly a "substantial factor
in causing the transaction[s] to take place" and additionally that plaintiff's in-
juries were proximately caused by defendant's actions.'"' Although defendant-
attorney did ultimately have minor direct dealings with the plaintiff, the court
did not provide an indication that this was an important fact.
While there appears to be no cut-and-dried answer as to who is a seller
under the substantial factor/proximate cause test of the Fifth Circuit, one
thing is certain, the imposition of liability is largely a factual question,, 2 and as
such, attorneys should constantly be aware of the potential ramifications for
rendering advice on a question involving securities in the Fifth Circuit.
Unique Position Test
The approach utilized by the Eighth Circuit focuses upon "whether the
defendant was uniquely positioned to ask relevant questions, acquire material
information, or disclose his findings."'0 3 Although the Eighth Circuit utilized
the Fifth Circuit's substantial factor/proximate cause test in a later case, the
court provided us with no indication that they were abandoning the
defendant's unique position test.' However, as evidence of the vitality of the
unique position test we can find many cases that still apply the test. 5 Other
courts, which place great emphasis on the defendant's involvement in the
fraudulent transaction, (including the Second and Fifth Circuits), have essen-
tially neglected to justify their decisions and rationale in terms of the legislative
history of the 1933 Act that they are applying.' ° Although not necessarily
"Id. at 459.
l"Id. at 465. Sullivan sought to rely on the holding in Pharo, 621 F.2d at 656.
'
0 Excalibur Oil, 616 F.Supp. at 465. The court explicitly rejected defendant-attorneys' attempt to rely on the
holding in Pharo and stated that "Sullivan [defendant-attorney] clearly falls within any of those formula-
tions as much more than a 'mere participant'. His representations to title were certainly 'a substantial factor
in causing the transaction[s] to take place."' (Plaintiffs] injury 'flowed directly and proximately from the ac-
tions of Sullivan - in the classic tort-liability sense ... [additionally] Sullivan was uniquely positioned to...
acquire material information and disclose his findings' with regard to the crucial condition of title." (foot-
notes omitted)
'
02See Croy, 624 F.2d at 714.
'
03Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1977).
'"'See Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981).
"
05See, e.g., Excalibur Oil Inc. v. Sullivan, 616 F.Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
"0 Wasson, 558 F.2d at 886. The Wasson court expressly rejected the Fifth Circuits test and stated that:
"Our difficulty with the Fifth Circuit's proximate cause test is that it fails to elucidate or focus the
trier of fact's attention on those policies which the Act was designed to implement and which, in our
judgment, ought to be the basis for a sale or offer to sell determination."
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reaching a different conclusion than the other tests, the Eighth Circuit in
Wasson v. Securities and Exchange Commission attempted to focus its ra-
tionale on the policies of the Act as the court discerned them to be from the
Act's legislative history. 7
The Wasson case arose when George Wasson, a broker, was suspended
from practice for forty-five days by the SEC for selling unregistered
securities. 00 Wasson was involved in the monitoring and subsequent sale of
S&M Industries, Inc. common stock.'t 9 The title of the shares were actually
held in the name of an officer of S&M Industries and the buyer of the stock
was an automobile dealer who agreed to exchange title to seven vehicles for
30,000 shares of S&M Industries common stock."0 Wasson, as broker, handled
all of the logistics of the transaction but failed to inform his superiors of the
particular exchange in this transaction."' The stock was subsequently
discovered to be unregistered and the SEC determined that Wasson's failure to
fully investigate and disclose the nature of the transaction rendered him a
"seller" of the securities under Section 5 of the 1933 Act."' Wasson subse-
quently appealed and the Eighth Circuit was then confronted with the issue of
whether or not Wasson should be treated as a "seller."
In affirming the SEC's decision, the court indicated that the principal
question to be answered was "whether [Wasson] was uniquely positioned to
ask relevant questions, acquire material information, or disclose his
findings. '""' The court determined that because Wasson's involvement was
substantial and he had been aware of the slightly questionable circumstances
of the "sale," that he was in a position to investigate the particulars of the
transaction and then disclose his findings."4 Because the defendant's involve-
1"'ld. As a practical matter, irrespective of the rationale applied, given the facts of this case, it in all probabili-
ty would have had the same outcome in either the Second, Fifth, or Eighth Circuits.
'ld. at 881-82. The SEC's decision was based on a determination that Wasson willfully violated §§ 5(a) and
5(c) of the 33 Act.
"Id. at 882.
1"Id. There were several facts that indicated this was a questionable transaction. Even more incriminating to
Wasson was the fact that he had full knowledge of the potential improprieties. In detailing the facts known
to Wasson and no one else, the Administrative Law Judge in the proceeding below stated:
".... but [what] Mr. Wasson did know, was that Davidson [the officer of S & M Industries) was not the
owner of the shares, the Lincoln Automobiles were to be received by several persons other than
Davidson.... and that the assignment of funds by Davidson to Prestige was in part designed to per-
mit the delivery of the cars prior to the settlement date." Id.
"'Id. It isn't apparent what effect this quashing of information by Wasson had on the outcome of the case. It
is possible that Wasson could have pulled his employers into the litigation if he had made them aware of the
transaction and they had not taken any affirmative action to stop the transaction.
112Id.
'1d. at 886.
"'Id. at 887. The court was explicit in chastizing Wasson and stated:
In our judgment, Wasson's conduct fits squarely within the holdings of those cases and the meaning
commonly given to the willful or reckless standard. He was aware of several facts suggesting the
suspicious nature of the transaction. With reckless indifference to those facts, he proceeded to
facilitate the sale, ignoring the obvious need for further inquiry and his duty to disclose all relevant in-
formation to his superiors. Id.
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ment in the transaction was a major factor the court relied upon in imposing
liability, it appears the Eighth Circuit's test is not quite as different as it would
like to believe." 5
Another case applying the unique position test was Hagert v. Glickman,
Lurie, Eiger & Co. "6 In Hagert, plaintiffs were purchasers of capital notes and
warrants to purchase stock in Med General, Inc."7 Med General ultimately
defaulted and the plaintiffs brought suit against Med General's board of direc-
tors, legal counsel, accountants and underwriters."' In support of their claim,
plaintiffs alleged that the prospectus and registration statement utilized in con-
junction with the public offering of the notes, and the 1978 annual report of
Med General contained materially false information and omissions of material
fact." 9 Plaintiffs named Med General's legal counsel as a defendant claiming
that either or both an aiding and abetting or primary liability theory should be
relied upon to impose liability upon the attorneys.'20 Although the court re-
jected the plaintiffs' aiding and abetting theory for the imposition of liability, 2
it granted the plaintiffs leave to amend the primary liability allegation.,
Unfortunately, Hagert did not consider the potential ramifications which
would arise should the Eighth Circuit's test be applied to attorneys. The hold-
ing in Hagert seems to indicate that an attorney would be required to inves-
tigate his clients and subsequently disclose any material information revealed
during those investigations. If this is actually what the Eighth Circuit requires,
it appears that attorneys may be faced with the unattractive dilemma of
deciding between the importance of attorneys' ethical obligations to their
clients and the duties imposed on them by the federal securities laws as inter-
preted by the Eighth Circuit.
Another recent example of the potentially broad ramifications of the
unique position test can be seen in the case of Lewis v. Schultz. 23 The litigation
in Lewis resulted from an unsuccessful tax shelter venture."' Plaintiff purchas-
"'See supra notes 106-107.
116520 F.Supp. 1028 (D. Minn. 1981).
"'Id. at 1030-31.
111d Plaintiff attempted to assert that all defendants should face liability because they did not adequately
describe the financial condition of the company.
"'Id at 1031.
1id.
1id. at 1034. The court expressly rejected the aiding and abetting theory "notwithstanding the expansive
view of privity generally taken with regard to Is 12]... [Alccordingly, plaintiffs' claim of aiding and abetting
.. are dismissed with prejudice." (Footnotes omitted.)
'id. at 1035. The reason the court granted leave to amend was so plaintiffs could better apprise defendants
of the conduct by which they allegedly violated the law. The court stated that:
"the defendants have a right to be informed whether they are being charged as principals or as control
persons... To the extent that a particular defendant is being charged as a principal, he or it is entitled
to be generally apprised of what kind of 'conduct' was engaged in that was an integral part of and a
substantial factor in effectuating the sales." Id. at 1036.
"'121985-1986 Transfer Binderl FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,363 (E.D. Ark. September 23, 1985).
"'Id. The actual venture was a tax shelter that was formed for the purpose of acquiring and operating a fuel
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ers in Lewis alleged that the partnership's attorney, accountants and engineers
violated Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act in connection with the sale of the part-
nership interests in the unsuccessful tax shelter venture.'25 The plaintiff alleged
that in connection with this unsuccessful venture that the defendant attorney:
(1) prepared the offering memorandum;
(2) prepared and filed the Certificate of Limited Partnership;
(3) rendered a tax opinion;
(4) rendered a legal opinion regarding the status of the partnership; and
(5) represented the Partnership in connection with the purchase of cer-
tain property."6
Because of this participation in the venture, plaintiffs asserted that the defen-
dants were placed in the position of being under an affirmative duty of disclos-
ure. 27 The court noted that it was quite possible that plaintiffs' allegations were
indicia of nothing more than the rendering of routine services.'28 Unfortunate-
ly, the court relied on the Wasson test and held that it could be possible
through further discovery, to ascertain whether or not defendant attorneys
were "uniquely positioned to ask relevant questions, acquire material informa-
tion or disclose [their] findings."'29 The court went further to hold that al-
though Wasson was not an attorney, the principle of examination of all cir-
cumstances to determine a defendant's participation regarding his ability to ac-
quire and subsequently disclose questionable circumstances should still be ap-
plied. 3
Obviously, the imposition of liability under the "unique position" test for-
mulated by the Eighth Circuit circuit is essentially a factual one. Therefore, it
would appear as if litigation involving attorneys alleged involvement in
securities sales may be on the upswing. Acceptance of such a test would seem-
ingly prevent courts from dismissing a case through means of a summary judg-
ment or on the pleadings.
What should be of greater concern to attorneys, is the potential imposi-
tion of liablity for the rendition of routine services. Because the "unique posi-
tion" test is imprecise and vague at best, it presents the possibility that profes-
sionals rendering routine services could face liability. Additionally, we are not
told what the duties of care will be. For example, are attorneys to be held to a
higher standard than accountants? Unfortunately, the Eighth Circuit has not
grade ethanol plant in Louisiana. The venture was set up as a limited partnership and the plaintiffs were
subscribers to the partnership.
1 ld. at 92,319.
12d.
"'Id. It is apparent that the plaintiffs were directly relying on Wasson as precedent.
" Id. Although the court recognized the contributions of Croy, the holding indicated that the reasoning put
forth by the Eighth Circuit was more persuasive.
1id.
10Id.
[Vol. 20:3
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 20 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss3/8
answered these questions. However, if the trend is an accurate tool for prog-
nostication, attorneys should remain attuned to the potential liability they may
face for merely rendering routine advice to a corporate client issuing securities.
Aiders and Abetters under Section 12
Although this theory of imposing liability has not resulted in the amount
of litigation that the "seller" definition or the "unique position" test, it is still
worth noting as a potential hazard to attorneys. Originally Section 12(2) was
given a restrictive application. The imposition of liability under Section 12 was
confined to the immediate seller or those who were in a controlling person rela-
tionship with the seller. 3' Individuals who allegedly "aided and abetted" the
fraudulent transaction, but who were not in privity with either the buyer or
seller were excluded from the coverage of Section 12(2) liability.' However,
such is no longer the case today. Alleged aiders and abettors under Section
12(2) in In re Caesers Palace Securities Litigation were ultimately found liable
to the plaintiffs under Section 12.11 The alleged aiders and abettors in Caesers
Palace were certain stockholders, employees, officers and partners of the cor-
poration and partnership that sold Caesars Palace Hotel and Casino to the
principal defendants and the immediate seller, Caesars World., In attempting
to avoid liability, the defendants tried to rely on Barlas and other decisions
which strictly interpreted Section 12.111 In rejecting the defendant's arguments,
the court held that individuals who are aware of or who participate in the
securities law violation and who provide assistance to the principle wrongdoers
should also be held liable under Section 12.136
"'See note 52 supra.
"'Barlas v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 11966 Transfer Binder], FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 191,674 (N.D. Il. 1966).
In holding that a theory of aiding and abetting was not a sufficient cause of action, the court stated: "The on-
ly allegation made by plaintiff ... [is] that all defendants 'aided and abetted' Karl Hope and Bear, Stearns &
Co. Such an allegation is not sufficient, inasmuch as plaintiff has failed to invoke the 'control' provisions of
Section 77(o), 151 and the Securities Act makes no provision for liability of parties on conspiracy grounds...
we must therefore rely on the clear language of the Statute... and the prevailing case law which holds that,
in the absence of 'control' allegation, a defendant shall only be liable 'to the person purchasing such security
from him."' Id. at 1 95,478.
".360 F.Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
"Id. at 375. Although this case does not involve the imposition of liability upon an attorney, the reasoning
that the court used in holding defendants liable could be readily implemented by a court seeking to impose
liability upon an attorney.
..Id. at 382. Other cases that defendant attempted to rely upon include: Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336
F.Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Lynn v. Caraway, 252 F.Supp. 858 (W.D. La. 1966), affd 379 F.2d 943 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 951 (1968); First Trust & Savings Bank of Zanesville, Ohio v. Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co., 112 F.Supp. 761 (E.D. Pa. 1953), affd, 214 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 856 (1954).
"In re Caesar's Palace, 360 F.Supp. at 382-83. The court was extremely explicit in rejecting defendants
arguments and stated: "The fundamental purpose of the Federal securities laws, . . . is to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry.' To this end, the courts have continually recognized the broad,
remedial nature of the 1933 Act and the need to adopt a liberal interpretation of the statute in order to best
effectuate the congressional pur ... Our interpretation of § 12(2) is, we believe, wholly consistent with
these ends." (citations omitted).
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Although there are apparently as of yet no cases that have applied the
aider and abettor theory of liability under Section 12 to defendant-attorneys,
caution should nevertheless be maintained due to the potential for expansion
of this theory of liability.
POTENTIAL CLAIMS UNDER THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Section 10(b) Claims
This is the area of the federal securities laws which present the greatest
area of concern for attorneys. It is generally accepted that there are two
theories under which Section 10(b) liability may be imposed upon an attorney.
The first, primary liability, stems from the misconduct of the attorney. The
second, secondary liability, stems from the fact that an attorney aided and
abetted a wrongdoer.
At one time, the threshold issue for determining potential violations of
Section 1 0(b) was whether or not negligent behavior would suffice to sustain a
cause of action. Early case law seemed to suggest the possibility that an at-
torney who negligently investigated the representations made to him in a
client's prospectus information, may face liability under Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 promulgated thereunder of the 1934 Act.' However, the Supreme
Court has more recently interpreted Section 10(b) to prohibit fraud in connec-
tion with the sale of a security.'38 This requirement of fraud quite obviously re-
quires that the attorney be guilty of something greater than mere negligence.
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act essentially allows claims to be imposed on
any individuals who make representations with respect to or in connection
with the sale of securities. 3 Unlike Section 12 of the 1933 Act, a defendant is
not required to be a seller, or even a promoter to be exposed to potential liabili-
ty under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. It is for this reason that attorneys per-
forming even routine services face the greatest risk of liability under this sec-
tion.
Direct Liability
The theory that an attorney can be held liable under Section 10(b) of the
"'SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
"'Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
"'The primary area of this inquiry will focus on violations of Rule lOb-5 promulgated under § 10) of the
1934 Act. This rule states that: "It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any faculty of any national securities
exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
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1934 Act for direct participation in a securities transaction can be traced to the
frequently cited case of SEC v. Frank.'" In Frank, defendant-attorney
prepared the offering prospectus for a New York intrastate securities offering
of the Nylo-Thane Plastics Corporation.' The initial offering of the stock con-
sisted of 100,000 shares of common stock at $3.00 per share, however im-
mediately following the completion of the public offering, the stock traded as
high as $17.50 per share. "2 The Securities and Exchange Commission subse-
quently discovered what it considered to be serious misrepresentations in the
offering circular. " As a result of this, on April 27, 1967, the SEC suspended
trading in the stock.'44 Subsequently, Nylo-Thane retained new counsel to help
clear up the discrepancies and misrepresentations in the offering circular.'45
Thereafter, the SEC instituted an action against all parties involved in the of-
fering to enjoin any further misrepresentations.'" All defendants, excluding
Frank, agreed to the entry of a permanent injunction.'47 Because Frank refused
to consent to the injunction, the SEC sought and was ultimately granted an in-
junction enjoining Frank pendente lite from drafting any untrue statements
concerning the principal product of a corporation. 8 It is from that ruling that
Frank appealed.
Frank asserted that in granting an injunction, the court was placing
liability on a scrivenor whose sole function was to help the officers of Nylo-
Thane prepare their offering circular in proper form and that he did not
substantively participate.4 9 In rejecting Frank's assertions, the court stated
that "[11n our complex society the ... lawyer's opinion can be [an] instrument
for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar."' 5
However, the court also provided an indication that it would be unreasonable
to impose liability upon an attorney who merely put a client's description of a
highly technical chemical process into understandable English. 5' Nevertheless,
'388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
"
11d at 487.
1
4 1id at 487-88.
4
31Id. at 488.
144 Id.
143 d
.
'Id. The SEC action was instituted against Nylo-Thane, three officers or stockholders of Nylo-Thane, a
financial consultant to the corporation, and attorney Frank.
W47d. As a practical matter this is a big time saver. Although defendants consent to an injunction, they
neither admit nor deny the allegations in the complaint. This willingness to consent to a permanent injunc-
tion keeps the parties involved relatively happy while avoiding the time and expense involved in potentially
protracted litigation.
1 1id. at 487.
' 
9 d. at 488.
01d. at 488-89, citing U.S. v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
The court went even further to inform us that a lawyer has no privilege to assist in the circulation of an of-
fering circular which he knows to contain false statements simply because his client provided him with the
information.
"'Frank, 388 F.2d at 489. It would be unreasonable to find fraud because the attorney lacked the technical
ability to fully understand slight discrepancies between the technical data and his translations.
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in Frank, the court did impose liability because the defendant was supplied
with information that even a non-expert would recognize as containing false
statements. 5 2 The court went on to hold that "a lawyer, no more than others,
can escape liability for fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw and could
readily understand."'1 3
A more recent imposition of liability under Section 1 0(b) upon an attorney
can be seen in Felts v. National Account Systems Association, Inc.'54 In Felts,
plaintiffs were purchasers of twelve-month promissory notes issued, offered,
sold and delivered by National Account Systems Association (NASA).'55
NASA offered these unregistered securities through means of oral and written
representations via brochures, offering circulars, packets and letters.'56 NASA
was represented to be a factoring company who supposedly factored the ac-
counts receivable of established manufacturing and retail firms. "7 At the incor-
poration of NASA, the president and counsel for the firm was an attorney
named Peters.' s However, defendant Peters was aware from the start that his
presidency was merely titular and his authority, at least as president, was in ac-
tuality exercised by someone else.'59 NASA subsequently began selling the
promissory notes through the methods previously noted. 6° These sales were ef-
fectuated through the utilization of false and misleading materials' 6' Although
all of the defendants in the trial were held to be jointly and severally liable, 62
this discussion will focus on the liability imposed upon the attorney.
In reaffirming the Frank decision, the court held that an attorney has no
privilege to assist in the circulation of false offering materials simply because
they were supplied to him by his client.' 3 However, the court was more ada-
mant in its position and stated that "the lawyer for the issuer plays a unique
and pivotal role in the effective implementation of the securities laws," because
of this, special duties are to be imposed on the lawyer.'" These duties include
"521d.
153/d.
"5469 F.Supp. 54 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
'"Id. at 58. What actually prompted the suit was that defendant was in default on interest payments to the
noteholders.
U"Id. at 59.
1"Id. A firm involved in factoring essentially serves as a provider of cash flow for firms that are in need of a
faster cash flow. Factoring involves the purchase of a firms accounts receivable. These purchased accounts
are bought at a discount and subsequently collected at face value. Therefore, the spread between the dis-
count and the face value would be a factoring company's profits.
'oId at 60.
1"9Id.
'
1 1d. at 60-62.
'Id. at 70. This excludes of course those individual defendants with whom settlement was reached during
the trial.
'11d. at 67.
'"Id. The court was explicitly in its demands of attorneys in the field of securities law and stated:
"The securities laws provide a myriad of safeguards designed to protect the interests of the investing
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the obligation to exercise due diligence, including reasonable inquiry with
respect to responsibilities he has voluntarily undertaken. 5 Furthermore, he
has an affirmative duty to make a "reasonable" and "independent" investiga-
tion to determine and correct false or misleading statements.'" Additionally, if
an attorney has a relationship with the purchaser, the attorney will face an
even stricter standard of investigation and disclosure.'67 In reviewing the stan-
dards of care the court had accepted as applicable, the court ultimately held
that without the affirmative assistance of Peters, the sales would not have been
consummated.'68 Although Peters was also the "President" of NASA, ap-
parently the lack of this factor would not have prevented the court from im-
posing liability upon Peters. Although this discussion of case law for imposing
liability under Section 10(b) for direct participation by an attorney is far from
exhaustive, it indicates that an attorney who simply drafts a misleading pro-
spectus or offering circular may be held liable under Section 10(b), even if that
was the total extent of his involvement. In fact, a recent Supreme Court deci-
sion specifically allowed for the possibility of holding an attorney liable under
Section 10(b) for rendering professional services. In Herman and MacLean v.
Huddleston, 69 the court determined that Section 10(b) should be given a broad
reading and its application should not be narrowed by existence of an express
remedy under Section 11 of the 1933 Act. The court stated that certain in-
dividuals, who assisted in the preparation of registration statements, including
lawyers not acting as experts, cannot be reached under Section 11 of the 1933
Act, and if we did not apply Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, such individuals
would be immune from liability.'70 Such an application of the federal securities
laws would be wholly inconsistent with their remedial purposes.'7 '
A recent decision firmly entrenched the theory that an attorney could
face Section 10(b) liability for merely rendering routine services. In Reingold v.
Deloitte Haskins & Sells, one of the defendants was an attorney retained by a
foreign corporation for the purpose of insuring that the corporation complied
with federal securities laws.'72 When plaintiffs subsequently filed suit for viola-
tions of Section 10(b), the defendant-attorney asserted that he was merely
rendering professional services and acting in an advisory capacity and
therefore, he should not be subject to liability under Rule 10b-5.1" The court
public. Effective implementation of those safeguards, however, depends in large measure on the
members of the bar who serve in an advisory capacity to those engaged in securities transactions."
Id. citing, SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1973).
,
651d.
1
"Id. citing, Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F.Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
167Id.
"1Id. at 68.
"-459 U.S. 375, 386 (1983).
170Id.
"'Id. at 386-87.
'599 F.Supp. 1241, 1267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
"'Id. at 1269.
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refused to accept the defendant's argument and held that if the plaintiffs com-
plaint "only" alleged claims against the defendant-attorney for filing the
registration statements, such a cause of action would still be sufficient."'
Obviously, if an attorney who renders routine professional services may
face Section 10(b) liability, then an attorney whose participation involves more
than the mere rendering of professional services will most definitely face the
threat of Section 10(b) liability. Such additional involvement is exactly what
placed liability upon defendant attorneys in the case of Freschi v. Grand Coal
Venture.'" In Freschi, not only did the defendant-attorneys materially
misrepresent the facts involving the tax shelter program of Grand Coal Ven-
tures, the defendants actually participated in the marketing and organization
of such venture. 76 Additionally, the law firm where defendant-attorneys were
partners was also involved in the Grand Coal Ventures.'77 For these reasons,
the court held that defendant attorneys, as well their law firm, should face
liability under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. "'
Although it is obvious that an attorney may face liability for merely
rendering professional services, they are not without a defense. To avoid liabili-
ty an attorney may claim that he lacked the requisite scienter or he was
technically inadequate to appreciate the falsities. 79 However, both of these
defenses are difficult to successfully assert and should be viewed as possible
defenses and not definitive ways to avoid liability.
Aiders and Abetters under Section 10(b)
Of greater concern to attorneys is the potential for being held liable for
assisting someone in the commission of a violation of the federal securities
laws. Although neither the federal securities laws or Rule 10b-5 10 specifically
delineate a cause of action for aiding and abetting liability, the courts have ap-
parently judicially promulgated such liability. 8' The reason this imposition of
aiding and abetting liability for attorneys is so important is that, in most cases,
the attorney is not the principal wrongdoer. Additionally, as a practical matter,
the plaintiff will attempt to draw as many defendants into a cause of action as
1741Id.
17767 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1985).
171d. at 1048-49.
"Id. at 1049. The law firm where defendant-attorneys were partners in actuality had extensive involvement
with the name defendant. Three of the principals of the Grand Coal Venture were partners in the law firm.
The law firms physical facilities were utilized to market the graudulent Grand Coal Venture scheme. Final-
ly, the finances of both groups were deeply intertwined.
1701d.
'See Frank, 388 F.2d at 486.
lwFor the text of this Rule, see supra note 139.
"'See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982); Decker v. Massey-Fergusen, Ltd.,
681 F.2d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1982); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 908 (1975).
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possible in an effort to find the deepest pocket.' 2
Although the actual test for aiding and abetting varies slightly among the
circuits, the courts have generally delineated three elements that are required
to successfully establish aiding and abetting liability under Rule lOb-5. These
elements are:
(1) some individual (primary violator) has committed a violation of Rule
I Ob-5;
(2) that the defendant had knowledge of or recklessly disregarded the
violation; and
(3) that the defendant substantially assisted in or substantially par-
ticipated in the fraud." 3
For the first requirement to be met, the plaintiff must show that some
other person has actually committed a securities law violation.' 4 All that plain-
tiff need show is that the primary violator's actions would be sufficient to meet
the requirements of an ordinary civil claim under Rule lOb-5.'85 Although
there is usually little difficulty in establishing who is the primary violator, this
must still be given adequate attention by the plaintiff so that the court can de-
termine the collateral parties who should be subjected to potential aiding and
abetting liability."6 Although a primary violator is generally given little atten-
tion, without the establishment of one, a defendant cannot be held liable as an
aider and abettor.8 7 However, even though this is a key element, the majority
of attention has consistently focused on the knowledge or assistance
elements.'88
In order for the second requirement to be met, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant attorney had a general awareness that his role was part of an
overall activity that was improper.'89 However, some courts have even gone so
'For a good discussion of the theories of secondary liability under the federal securities laws, see Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, In-
demnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972).
'See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779 (8th
Cir. 1981); Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919
(1980); liT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d
793,799 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84
(5th Cir. 1975).
'"SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
"'For a good discussion of the elements for a private cause of action under Rule lOb-5, see Comment, Rule
lob-5 Liability After Hochfelder: Abandoning the Concept ofAiding and Abetting, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 218,
219 n. 7 (1977).
'"Ruder, supra note 182, at 628-30.
"'See Morgan v. Prudential Funds, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binderl FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,345 at 93,172
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Ruder, supra note 182 at 630. In Morgan, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim for failing to
properly allege a primary violation of rule lOb-5.
'"Ruder supra note 182, at 630. Ruder refers to the primary violation requirement as the "unarticulated
premise."
'"Coffey, 493 F.2d at 1316.
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far as to expand this element and require that defendant merely know of the
primary violation.'" Although this expansive position is sometimes recognized,
it is generally viewed as too expansive and that the proper standard to be uti-
lized in determining whether or not there was knowledge is whether or not
defendant-attorney's knowledge can be shown by circumstantial evidence, or
reckless conduct.' However, the proof must demonstrate the actual aware-
ness of the attorney's role in the fraudulent transaction. 9 2 In discussing the fac-
tors in determining whether or not the knowledge requirement has been met,
the Fifth Circuit indicated that the nature of the transaction, the particular
type of security involved, and any duties that the law has imposed on defen-
dant are all critical factors and must be reviewed in determining whether the
knowledge element is met.'93
The third element, substantial assistance, seemingly presents a major hur-
dle for a plaintiff to overcome. However, courts have frequently determined
that activities generally viewed as the rendition of routine services could con-
stitute substantial assistance. 94 Additionally, courts have held that if a defen-
dant has an affirmative independent duty to disclose a wrongdoing, that this
conduct may fulfill the substantial assistance element. 95 Even without the proof
of fraud, an attorney who drafted a prospectus or filed registration statements
with the SEC could be found to have substantially assisted a wrongdoer. 16
Although the application of substantial assistance has at times been
troublesome for courts, 197 they have generally reviewed the facts of each case
and rather than formulating a precise definition, have placed greater emphasis
on the totality of the circumstances rather than the precision of a definition. 19'
As one can see, it seems relatively easy to impose liability on an attorney
for aiding and abetting a violator of Rule 1Ob-5 and Section 10(b) of the 1934
'"See Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
"'See Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
"Id at 96.
"Ild at 95-97.
1'See Fletcher v. Kletz, 266 F.Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Fletcher, the court found substantial assis-
tance where an accounting firm prepared a financial report. The court denied the accounting firms motion
to dismiss because they failed to make a timely disclosure of misleading figures in the certified financial
statements.
"'See, e.g., Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 798 (1986); Woodward,
522 F.2d at 84; Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844-46 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'don other grounds, 463 U.S. 646
(1983). In Dirks, the court held that the defendant violated rule lOb-5 as an aider and abettor because he failed
to disclose the existence of a fraud when he had "a duty to the public and to the SEC not to foster the sale of
fraudulent or worthless securities."
"Felts, 469 F. Supp. at 54. For a discussion of the facts in Felts, see notes 153-167 and accompanying text,
supra.
"'For a good discussion on the historical difference of opinions in the various circuits in attempting to define
substantial assistance, see, Note, Rule lOb-5: Liability for Aiding and Abetting After Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 999, 1010-14 (1976).
'"See A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8.5 (531), at 208.20-.21
(1983).
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Act. In attempting to defeat such a claim, an attorney could possibly claim
that he had made reasonable efforts to ascertain the veracity of the data given
to him by the client. 99 However, to do so would tend to infringe on a client's
potent defense of reasonable reliance upon counsel."° Although reliance upon
counsel will not allow a client to totally avoid liability, °0 a client may seek to
rebut a claim of fraud by showing he had acted in reliance on a reputable, well
chosen law firm and that he fully disclosed all material information. This is
where the potential conflict arises for attorneys. On the one hand, they are
anxious to avoid the imposition of liability upon themselves. However, if they
intend to maintain an on-going relationship with the client charged with the
primary violation, they may not want to discredit a potentially effective
defense for their client. As you can see, an attorney caught in such a dilemma
may be forced to "foot the bill" to maintain an ongoing business relationship
with a lucrative client. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that attorneys
expend all practical effort in ascertaining the legality or veracity of a transac-
tion on behalf of their client, prior to its commencement.
CONCLUSION
Although there are other situations where an attorney, providing service
to a corporate client issuing securities, may be potentially liable for securities
law violations," 2 the objective of this article was not to provide an exhaustive
compilation of potential liabilities. Instead, the focus was to illustrate the trend
and potential for liability being imposed upon members of the securities bar in
situations that were most likely to occur in practice. As one can see, the
isolated Sections of the federal laws that were addressed in this article revealed
voluminous amounts of litigation.
As an overview, there are several observations that should be of major
significance to members of the securities bar. First, there is definitely a trend
toward the imposition of liability upon attorneys in cases involving securities
law violations. Second, as plaintiffs become more aware of this potential liabili-
ty, more attorneys will be named as defendants in litigation involving securities
law violations. Third, it will be extremely difficult to dispose of a claim prior to
trial with techniques such as a summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.
Because of this, one should expect the threat of litigation to become a more
'"In utilizing this defense, an attorney could also attempt to avoid liability under § 12 of the 1933 Act and §
14 of the 1934 Act.
10OFor a good discussion of the usage and elements of the defense of reliance upon counsel, see Hawes and
Sharrad, Reliance on Advise of Counsel as a Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1,
19-40 (1976). For a defendant to claim this defense he must show that in good faith and with due care he: (1)
selected counsel he believed to be competent; (2) disclosed to counsel all facts which he believed to be rele-
vant; and (4) acted in accordance with such advice after it had been rendered. (footnotes omitted)
211SEC v. Savoy Industries Inc., 665 F.2d 1310 n. 28 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
mOther areas of liability that may impose liability upon attorneys for rendering advice to corporate clients
issuing securities include "control person" liability under § 15 of the 1933 Act and § 20 of the 1934 Act.
Another potentially dangerous area could be the expansive application of state and federal Rico statutes.
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powerful tool against potential attorney-defendants in securities law cases.
Finally, because of all of these negative factors resulting from this expansion of
liability under the federal securities laws, the people who will suffer the most
are the individuals or corporations seeking the services of a securities attorney.
Although there are obviously instances where an attorney has violated the
federal securities laws, it appears as if the courts are attempting to judicially
broaden the statutory scheme of liability imposed upon attorneys. While it is
important that investors are afforded protections under the securities laws, it
does burden the people in need of a securities attorney's services. This expan-
sion of liability will ultimately force attorneys to become extremely cautious.
Additionally, it is quite possible that the already expensive fee schedule for
securities advice will undergo a boost to compensate the attorneys for the add-
ed threat of liability.
Although it is apparent that investors should be afforded some degree of
protection, it is not apparent that they should be able to impose wholesale
liability upon everyone involved in securities transactions. Granted, those at-
torneys who have willfully violated the federal securities laws should face
liability, it seems unfortunate that attorneys merely rendering routine advice
to corporate clients issuing securities may now also face liability.
JOSEPH REECE
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